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IDIOTS AND INSANE, AND THOSE EXCLUDED FROM SOCIETY BY
INFAMOUS CRIMES, ARE MANIFESTLY NOT A
PART OF THE ACTING SOCIETY. . . .”
– MASSACHUSETTS STATE DELEGATE (1853)1
“THE VOTE IS THE MOST POWERFUL INSTRUMENT EVER DEVISED
BY MAN FOR BREAKING DOWN INJUSTICE AND DESTROYING
THE TERRIBLE WALLS WHICH IMPRISON MEN
BECAUSE THEY ARE DIFFERENT.”
– PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON,
AT THE SIGNING OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 19652
+ The use of the word “idiots” in the title of this work reflects the outmoded language used
by the Massachusetts State Delegate in 1853 in the quote directly following the title. As this
Article makes clear, the author declaims, rather than endorses, the use of such language to refer to
persons with cognitive disabilities.
* This Article grew out of my work with U.S. District Court Judge Donovan W. Frank and
Dr. Colleen Wieck, Executive Director of the Minnesota Governor’s Council on Developmental
Disabilities, collaborating with Twin Cities Public Television to create a website resource for
those interested in disability justice: http://disabilityjustice.org/. The website project was sup-
ported by a cy pres fund established in the settlement of a class action law suit brought by a group
of people with disabilities in a residential facility in the state of Minnesota. Jensen v. Minnesota
Dept. of Human Services, No. 09–1775, 2011 WL 6178845 (D. Minn. December 5, 2011). I
would like to thank Judge Frank and Dr. Wieck for their untiring dedication to the cause of
disability justice throughout their careers. I would also like to thank Julie Cayemberg for her
excellent research assistance on the entire website project, in particular on the topic of voting
rights. Finally, I would also like to thank the brilliant and dedicated student editors of the Univer-
sity of St. Thomas Law Journal for organizing this symposium and working so hard to memorial-
ize the contributions of all its participants in this symposium issue.
1. Kay Schriner, The Competence Line in American Suffrage Law: A Political Analysis, 22
DISABILITY STUD. Q. 61 (2002), http://www.dsq-sds.org/article/viewFile/345/438.
2. Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. President, Remarks in the Capitol Rotunda at the Signing of the
Voting Rights Act (Aug. 6, 1965), http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.
hom/650806.asp.
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In the story of the gradual triumph of Professor tenBroek’s vision of
the integration of people with disabilities in the United States,3 our
protagonists spend a good deal of time fighting to differentiate themselves
from persons imprisoned for criminal offenses. The most dramatic chapter
in this story was opening the doors of the prison-like institutions in which
people with disabilities had been incarcerated, a chapter that, sadly, is not
yet fully written.4 Many of the incremental steps in the process of
integrating people with disabilities were achieved on the backs of legal
victories for convicted criminals, based on arguments that people with
disabilities deserve to be treated at least as well as those incarcerated for
criminal offenses—with respect to the right to decent living conditions,
freedom from torture, freedom from unwarranted restraints, and the right to
treatment or habilitation.5
The association of convicted felons with persons who have cognitive
disabilities is most blatantly and persistently fixed, however, in connection
with the right to vote. The U.S. Constitution affords neither group any
protection against disenfranchisement. Furthermore, the Federal Voting
Rights Act specifically permits states to deny the right to vote to people for
only two reasons: “by reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity.”
The majority of the states exercise that power by disenfranchising both
categories of people.6 Analysis of the legitimacy of the disenfranchisement
of felons is a complex issue, raising significantly different historical,
statutory, and policy issues than those at stake in the disenfranchisement of
people with cognitive disabilities.7 This Article will not address the
legitimacy of disenfranchisement of convicted criminals. Instead, this
Article will focus on the disenfranchisement of persons with cognitive
disabilities and the entrenched presumptions that justify the general
conflation of people with cognitive disabilities and convicted felons as the
only two groups of adult citizens denied the right to vote.
3. Samuel R. Bagenstos, From Integrationism to Equal Protection: tenBroek and the Next
25 Years of Disability Rights, 13 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. (forthcoming 2016).
4. At the time of the writing of this Article, the State of Minnesota and Minnesota’s
Department of Human Services are working under the oversight of a court-appointed monitor to
implement a settlement reached in 2011 with people in a residential program for persons with
developmental disabilities, addressing allegations of unwarranted use of restraints and other
unjustified aversive practices in state-run facilities. See Jensen v. MN Dept. of Human Services,
DISABILITYJUSTICE.ORG, http://disabilityjustice.org/jensen-case/ (last visited June 21, 2016).
5. See infra, notes 125–39 and accompanying text.
6. The disenfranchisement of people with cognitive disabilities is described infra, notes
13–72 and accompanying text. For a survey of felony disenfranchisement laws, see The
Sentencing Project, Losing the Vote: The Impact of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws in the
United States, http://pantheon.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/vote/.
7. For an introduction to the issues raised by felon disenfranchisement, see Pamela S.
Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate Over Felon
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147 (2004); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259 (2004).
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This Article will explore the question of whether denying the right to
vote to persons with cognitive impairments is justified. Should the right to
vote be added to Professor Bagenstos’s list of issues coming to the fore in
disability law and policy that might best be addressed by employing
tenBroek’s abolitionist understanding of equal protection?8 Understanding
the Equal Protection Clause as “an integral part of the doctrines of the
social compact and natural rights [entitled to protection] by government”9
might provide an argument for amending the Voting Rights Act. It might
also support subsequent actions of Congress that would likely be necessary
to “make up a state’s deficiency and give protection” in situations where
“persons are not protected in their natural rights at all, or are not as well
protected as others, or if citizens are not protected in their privileges and
immunities.”10
In Part I of this Article, I will describe the legal basis for the
disenfranchisement of persons with cognitive impairments in the United
States under which a majority of states retain such restrictions. I will then
discuss the area in which there is currently the most movement, namely,
challenging state laws that establish guardianship as a proxy for mental
incapacity justifying disenfranchisement. Developments in this area appear
to be approaching a consensus that laws categorically disenfranchising
those with cognitive impairments, without considering the individual’s
ability to comprehend the nature and act of voting, are neither
constitutionally defensible, nor compatible with evolving trends toward
empowering people with cognitive disabilities to the extent feasible. At the
same time, though, this emerging consensus is not fueling any widespread
movement toward amending state constitutions or laws to remove legal
impediments to voting. Indeed, informal barriers to voting, often taking the
form of private actions that effectively disenfranchise people with cognitive
disabilities, persist. This ambivalence about voting rights for people with
cognitive disabilities raises the underlying question of whether mental
incapacity is, in fact, a valid reason to deny a person the vote, regardless of
the level of impairment.
In addressing that question, Part II will explore the rationales for
denying that right to a person with a cognitive disability, demonstrating that
they do not, in fact, hold up to careful scrutiny. I will argue that the history
of the conflation of the rights of people with disabilities with the rights of
convicted felons reveals longstanding historic biases about people with
disabilities. These biases linger in our reflexive acceptance of largely
unsound arguments for denying the vote to people with cognitive
disabilities. Other countries, such as Canada, Italy, Ireland, Israel, and
8. Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 9.
9. JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 177
(1951).
10. Id. at 204–05.
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Sweden, impose no mental incapacity requirements on the right to vote.
Even short of enfranchisement, there are many reforms that could be
adopted to eliminate some of the existing barriers to voting by persons with
cognitive impairments. I will conclude that it is time to confront our biases
directly, and to offer our fellow citizens with cognitive impairments more
robust protections to their access to the fundamental power of the vote.
I. THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF PEOPLE WITH “MENTAL DEFICIENCIES”
Part I of this Article will describe the current legal landscape of the
voting rights of U.S. citizens with cognitive disabilities. Federal law dele-
gates to the states the authority to disenfranchise people with cognitive disa-
bilities. The majority of the states exercise that authority through
constitutional provisions and statutes. Those restrictions have begun to be
challenged in some states. In some states, the validity of using guardianship
as a proxy for lack of mental capacity to vote has been successfully chal-
lenged as a violation of the federal constitution. Other states, likely influ-
enced by arguments made in these lawsuits, have repealed or reformed
restrictive voting provisions. Despite this emerging consensus among these
states, courts, scholars, and organizations such as the American Bar Associ-
ation, there appears to be little public support for widespread enfranchise-
ment of people with cognitive impairments; indeed, there is growing
evidence of informal barriers to voting being imposed on this segment of
the population. By describing the current legal landscape, Part I will set the
stage for Part II’s exploration of the validity of the underlying rationales for
disenfranchising people with cognitive disabilities.
A. State Authority over Voting Rights under the U.S. Constitution
The U.S. Constitution provides that the right of a citizen of the U.S. to
vote cannot be denied by the federal government or by any state on account
of race, color, previous condition of servitude,11 sex,12 or age, provided the
voter is at least 18.13 Otherwise, the Constitution gives states the power to
set qualifications for voting.14 However, the right to vote has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court as a liberty interest protected under the 14th
Amendment to the Constitution.15 Thus, a state may not deprive a citizen of
the right to vote without “due process,” or in a way that violates the “equal
protection” clause of the 14th Amendment.16
The federal Voting Rights Act specifically gives states permission to
enact laws to deny the right to vote to people for only two reasons: “by
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
15. Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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reason of criminal conviction or mental incapacity.”17 And, indeed, the ma-
jority of states exercise that authority by denying the right to vote to people
with mental incapacities in some form.18
B. State Restrictions on Voting Rights of People with Mental
Incapacities
Forty states disenfranchise people with mental incapacity, using a wide
variety of constitutional and statutory provisions described in the following
sections.
1. Constitutional Disenfranchisement
According to a recent survey, the only states with “no constitutional
disenfranchisement provision for persons with a category of mental impair-
ment or disability” are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine,
New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, and Vermont.19 The existing disenfranchisement provisions in
state constitutions of the other states were typically added in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, around the same time that the people with disabili-
ties (along with the impoverished) were being isolated in large institutions
and subjected to eugenic practices and policies.20 Although the poorhouses
and asylums into which these populations were segregated have been
closed, and constitutional disenfranchisements of the poor have been re-
moved, many states retain the restrictions dealing with mental incapacity, in
the offensive and demeaning language of times in which they were enacted.
According to one recent survey of these provisions:
[S]even state constitutions deny the right to vote to ‘idiots or in-
sane’ persons. A number of states prohibit voting by those of un-
sound mind, non compos mentis, or those who are not of ‘quiet
and peaceable behavior.’ The constitutions of sixteen states bar
those adjudged mentally incompetent or incapacitated from vot-
17. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(3)(B) (2012).
18. For a detailed description of the specific language of the various constitutional and statu-
tory provisions restricting the right to vote for those with cognitive impairments, see Sally Balch
Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The Effect of Mental
Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 931, 934 (2007); see also Kay
Schriner, Lisa Ochs, & Todd Shields, Democratic Dilemmas: Notes on the ADA & Voting Rights
of People with Cognitive and Emotional Impairments, 21 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 437, 439
(2000); see also Addendum to the 2008 Voting Rights Guide for People with Mental Disabilities,
BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP (Aug. 30, 2012),
http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=SZZrfSzI8U0%3d&tabid=543.
19. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 936.
20. See Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1415, 1449–51 (2007).
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ing. In addition, four states prohibit persons ‘under guardianship’
from the electorate.21
These offensive characterizations of people with cognitive disabilities
clearly reflect outmoded attitudes about people with disabilities, and about
acceptable language for referring to people with disabilities. Furthermore,
these terms are typically not defined, giving rise to litigation to clarify their
meaning,22 as well as inconsistent and arbitrary application by untrained
election officials and caregivers.23
2. Statutory Disenfranchisement
In addition to state constitutional prohibitions, many state election
laws specifically address the right of persons with mental disabilities to
vote. Some of these state laws ignore the state constitutional provisions,24
and some are inconsistent with the state constitutions.25 Let us examine two
states with confusing state disenfranchisement schemes, both of which were
recently subject to judicial review: Maine and Minnesota. The struggles of
the judges forced to bring some sort of legal clarity to the inconsistent con-
stitutional, statutory, and practical interpretations being applied in these
states illustrates the issues raised in other states with similarly confused
schemes.
a. Maine.
The Maine Constitution, reflecting the trend of the late 19th century,
originally disenfranchised “paupers and persons under guardianship.”26 In
1965, Maine amended its Constitution to prohibit only persons who are
“under guardianship for reasons of mental illness” from voting.27 For about
twenty years, Maine’s Secretary of State interpreted this to mean that peo-
ple who were mentally ill, but not under guardianship, could vote; and that
people under guardianship for reasons other than mental illness could vote.
21. Ryan Kelley, Toward an Unconditional Right to Vote for Persons with Mental Disabili-
ties: Reconciling State Law with Constitutional Guarantees, 30 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359,
372–73 (2010).
22. See infra notes 39–72 and accompanying text; see also Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note
18, at 940–45.
23. See infra notes 83–93 and accompanying text.
24. Hurme and Appelbaum identify North Dakota, Utah, Alaska, and Florida as jurisdictions
in which the voting laws “appear to ignore constitutional provisions in their election laws that
specifically delineate those who are ineligible to vote.” Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at
937.
25. Hurme and Appelbaum note that “[i]n all but fourteen states, different terminology is
used in state election laws and state constitutions to describe persons ineligible to vote because of
cognitive impairment.” Id. at 936.
26. Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39 (D. Me. 2001) (citing Chapter 34 of the Resolves of
1965 at 1065).
27. ME. CONST. art. 2, § 1; 21-A M.R.S.A. § 115(1) (2001), repealed by P.L. 2001, ch. 516,
§ 1 (effective July 5, 2002).
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Only people placed under guardianship for “mental illness” by court order
were denied the right to vote.28 When this interpretation was challenged as
arbitrary, the State modified its interpretation, claiming that the constitu-
tional prohibition applied to everyone under full guardianship for any rea-
son—not just a psychiatric mental illness, but also mental retardation or
other unsoundness of mind.29
Adding to the confusion were seemingly contradictory provisions of
Maine’s voting and guardianship codes. In 2011, Maine enacted a law that
specifically provided that “[a] person with mental retardation or autism may
not be denied the right to vote for reasons of mental illness, as provided in
the Constitution of Maine, Article II, Section 1, unless under guardian-
ship.”30 Meanwhile, the Maine Probate Code, which directs the court to
establish guardianships only “to the extent necessitated by the incapacitated
person’s actual mental and adaptive limitations,”31 was being interpreted by
some probate judges to grant limited guardianships to people with mental
illness, specifically preserving the right to vote.32 Other probate judges
were deciding that the Constitution prohibited them from granting the right
to vote when the guardianship was the result of a mental illness.33
The Maine law thus illustrates one typical situation: language in a state
constitution or voting law raising issues that would seem to adversely im-
pact the voting rights of people with developmental disabilities, and prac-
tices in guardianship proceedings that are inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions.34
b. Minnesota.
Minnesota’s Constitution disenfranchises people convicted of treason
or felonies, people under guardianship, and people who are insane or not
mentally competent.35 Minnesota’s voting law36 and guardianship laws,37
on the other hand, both specifically say that people under guardianship re-
tain the right to vote unless under a guardianship in which the court order
revokes the ward’s right to vote. So, there would seem to be a direct con-
flict between Minnesota’s constitutional provision that people under guardi-
anship cannot vote, and Minnesota statutes that say people under
28. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 44.
29. Id. at 45–46.
30. 34-B M.R.S.A. § 57-5605(5) (2011).
31. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 5-304(a) (2010).
32. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 43.
33. Id.
34. Hurme and Appelbaum identify many states in which similar developments in guardian-
ship practices can raise conflicts with constitutional or statutory disenfranchisements statutes. See
supra note 18, at 950–56.
35. MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
36. Minn. Stat. § 201.014, Subd. 2(b) (2005).
37. Minn. Stat. §§ 524.5-310, 524.5-120(14) (2010).
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guardianship retain the right to vote, unless the guardianship order takes it
away.
The Minnesota law thus illustrates yet another typical situation: lan-
guage in a state constitution that would seem to adversely impact the voting
rights of people with developmental disabilities, and language in state laws
that is inconsistent with the state’s constitution.38
C. Contradictory Interpretations of the Constitutionality of State
Disenfranchisement Provisions
Both the Maine and the Minnesota disenfranchisement provisions have
been challenged recently for violating the U.S. Constitution.39 While the
results of these challenges have, in all cases, been to expand the right to
vote for some people with cognitive impairments, the reasoning has been
wildly inconsistent, raising many questions about the continued viability of
similar restrictions in other states with similar patterns of inconsistent con-
stitutional and statutory disenfranchisement provisions and practices. A
close look at how the different ways in which these courts responded to
challenges to state laws and practices based on the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution illuminates how ten-
Broek’s expansive understanding of equal protection is implicated by these
state laws.
1. Maine: Doe v. Rowe40
In 2001, a federal district court judge held that Maine’s disenfranchise-
ment laws violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.41 The Court held that, because voting is a
“fundamental liberty,” the Due Process Clause requires that the process a
state uses to take it away from someone has to follow basic procedural
protections that ensure “fundamental fairness.”42 When a court reviews
such procedures, it must weigh the competing interests of the State and the
individual losing the right to vote, and strike a balance that will minimize
the State’s risk of erroneously disenfranchising people who have the capac-
ity to vote.43 The Court found that Maine’s guardianship procedures vio-
38. Hurme & Appelbaum identify this pattern in the following additional states: Nevada,
Kentucky, New Mexico, and West Virginia. Supra note 18, at 937–38.
39. See, e.g., Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 35; see also Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Ritchie, 890
F. Supp. 2d 1106 (2012); see also In re Guardianship of Brian W. Erickson, No. 27-GC-PR-09-57
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.mncourts.gov/Documents/4/Public/Court_Administra
tion/Orders/Erickson,_Brian_WStanding_Order_re_Right_To_Vote_in_Guardianship_Cases.pdf.
40. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
41. Id. at 51–52. The Court also held that these laws violated ADA & Section 504 of Reha-
bilitation Act. Id. at 58–59.
42. Id. at 48 (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24).
43. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). Under the Constitution, when
a court reviews a state’s procedures for such a disenfranchisement, it must weigh the following
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lated due process because the wards did not require any advance notice that
a guardianship could lead to loss of the right to vote. This led to an inade-
quate opportunity to be heard, with a high risk of people being deprived of a
fundamental right. Providing specific notice as part of guardianship would
not be overly burdensome to the State.44
The Court also found that these provisions violated the Constitution’s
Equal Protection Clause. Because a restriction on voting restricts a funda-
mental right, the Court held that the laws a state passes to restrict that right
are subject to careful scrutiny; they have to: (1) promote a compelling state
interest, and (2) be written in a way that only promotes that interest and is
not overbroad.45 The Court accepted that the State had a compelling inter-
est: ensuring that “those who cast a vote have the mental capacity to make
their own decision by being able to understand the nature and effect of the
voting act itself.”46 But, the Court held that the provision was not narrowly
enough tailored so as to promote only that interest.47 The phrase “under
guardianship for mental illness” was not a permissible surrogate for “mental
incapacity to vote.”48 Maine defines those excluded as being limited to
those under guardianship for “traditional psychiatric disorders”, “while per-
mitting incapacitated persons diagnosed with mental retardation or senility
to vote as they choose.”49 But plenty of people with traditional psychiatric
disorders, such as the plaintiffs in Doe v. Rowe (who were diagnosed with
bipolar disorder) can understand the nature and effect of voting. Con-
versely, many people permitted to vote under this standard (those with
mental retardation or senility) might not understand the nature and effect of
voting. The Court wrote: “In short, the State has disenfranchised a subset of
mentally ill citizens based on a stereotype rather than any actual relevant
incapacity. Such state action cannot survive strict scrutiny because there is
no factually valid correlation between the ends and the means.”50
factors: the person’s interest in participating in the democratic process through voting; the risk of
erroneous deprivation of the right to vote under the procedures the state uses; and the state’s
interest, including any extra administrative or financial burden on the state from requiring addi-
tional procedures. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
44. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 49.
45. Id. at 51.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 56.
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id. at 52.
50. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
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2. Minnesota: Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Ritchie51and In re
Guardianship of Brian W. Erickson52
In 2012, two challenges in Minnesota state and federal courts resulted
in the enfranchisement of the citizens bringing the claims, but under differ-
ent reasoning.
In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Ritchie, United States District Court
Judge Donovan Frank held that the Minnesota Constitution and the state
statutes could be interpreted together consistently in a way that did not vio-
late due process.53 Though the Constitution’s plain language prohibits indi-
viduals “under guardianship” from voting, it does not define “person under
guardianship.”54 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the regu-
lation of guardianship is left to the state legislature.55 Minnesota’s state
guardianship laws do not categorically deny the right to vote for those
under guardianship. “[N]otwithstanding the state constitution’s apparent
categorical ban on the rights of persons ‘under guardianship’ to vote, under
Minnesota law ‘persons under guardianship are presumed to retain the right
to vote unless otherwise ordered by a court. . . . Thus, the constitutional
prohibition against voting based on guardianship status applies only when
there has been an individualized judicial finding of incapacity to vote.’”56
The Court carefully examined the procedures for guardianship in Min-
nesota, noting the notice required in petitioning for guardianship and the
proposed wards’ right to be represented by counsel and right to appointed
counsel if none is otherwise provided.57 Minnesota voting statutes also re-
quire the Statewide Voter Registration System to be updated when guardi-
anship of a ward previously registered to vote is lifted or removed. Thus, in
contrast to the situation in Maine, the Minnesota court found that the proce-
dures for disenfranchising voters did not violate the Due Process Clause.58
In In re Guardianship of Brian W. Erickson, Probate Judge Jay M.
Quam was faced with a petition by the guardian of a person who was placed
under guardianship due to a diagnosis of schizophrenia.59 The guardian
asked the court for a declarative judgment about whether people under
guardianship retained the right to vote, unless it was specifically denied in
the guardianship order.60 The judge discussed the inconsistency between
the Minnesota Constitution, which specifically says people under guardian-
51. Minnesota Voters Alliance, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
52. In re Guardianship of Brian W. Erickson, supra note 39.
53. Minnesota Voters Alliance, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
54. Id. at 1115.
55. Id. (citing State of MN ex re. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey Cnty., 205 Minn. 545,
287 N.W. 297, 299 (1939)).
56. Id. at 1117 (citing Minn. Stat. § 201.014, Subd. 2(b); Minn. Stat. §§ 524.5–313(c)(8)).
57. Id. at 1118.
58. Id.
59. In re Guardianship of Brian W. Erickson, supra note 39, at 3.
60. Id. at 2.
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ship do not have the right to vote, and the Minnesota statutes, which say
that persons under guardianship have the right to vote unless it is specifi-
cally taken away by the court in the guardianship order.61 Contrary to Judge
Frank, Judge Quam did not think that it was so clear that the Minnesota
Constitution delegated to the legislature the power to decide who under
guardianship could vote, and who could not vote.62 Instead, he determined
that this provision in Minnesota’s Constitution violated the federal
Constitution.63
He reasoned that since voting is a fundamental right under both federal
and state constitutions, restrictions to it are subject to strict scrutiny.64 Cit-
ing Doe v. Rowe, he held that Minnesota’s constitutional provision denying
all under guardianship the right to vote violated the Equal Protection
Clause:
Just as the Rowe court found that Maine’s ‘mental illness’ cate-
gory could not serve as a synonym for voting incapacity, neither
can Minnesota’s ‘under guardianship’ category. There are simply
too many people under guardianship who are fully capable of ex-
ercising sound electoral judgment for the Court to conclude that
the Minnesota Constitution can categorically disenfranchise those
under guardianship as uniformly lacking the capacity to vote. In-
deed, the Minnesota Legislature seems to recognize this fact by
virtue of the current statutes which ensure that those subject to
guardianships retain the right to vote unless a court takes that
right away. Thus, just as in Rowe, the language in Article VII is
not narrowly tailored to the degree necessary to pass federal con-
stitutional muster.65
He also found that it violated the Due Process Clause, because:
[T]here is no uniform notice provided to proposed wards in Min-
nesota that their capacity to vote will be evaluated and their right
to vote may be taken away if they are placed under guardianship.
Moreover, the Court is not aware of any common practice among
petitioners of providing such notice to proposed wards, even on a
voluntary basis. This lack of notice that such a fundamental right
will be analyzed—and may be taken away by the Court—is un-
questionably a violation of Due Process.66
61. Id. at 5–6.
62. Judge Quam rejected the argument based on Pearson, on which Judge Frank had relied,
because it dealt with sex offenders, not voting; he argued that the legislature cannot amend the
Constitution by statute; and rejected the argument that the MN Constitution is intended only to
disenfranchise persons under guardianship who are also incompetent (that would render portions
of the Constitution superfluous—bans both those under guardianship and persons not mentally
competent from voting). Id. at 8–9.
63. Id. at 19–20.
64. Id. at 14.
65. In re Guardianship of Brian W. Erickson, supra note 39, at 20.
66. Id.
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In a footnote, Judge Quam disagreed with Rowe’s suggestion that pro-
bate court should only evaluate voting capacity if a petitioner raises the
issue: “As much as the Court respects the judgment of petitioners who
come into court, the Court believes that it has an independent obligation to
assess the voting capacity of each ward. It owes the general electorate at
least that much.”67
Judge Quam announced that henceforth, in Hennepin County Probate
Court, proposed wards in all guardianship proceedings would have the right
to be specifically informed that a ward’s capacity to vote will be analyzed
by the Court and that the right to vote may be taken away.68 Furthermore,
probate judges would specifically inquire at each guardianship proceeding
into a proposed ward’s capacity to vote and make an individual determina-
tion of whether the ward’s right to vote would be taken away.69 With re-
spect to persons presently under guardianship, they would retain their right
to vote unless it is specifically taken away.70 In that particular case, testi-
mony from a guardian was held to demonstrate that the ward did have suffi-
cient capacity and understanding to make an informed and intelligent vote,
and he thus retained the right to vote.71 Judge Quam concluded:
At least as it pertains to those under guardianship, Article VII of
the Minnesota Constitution is a vestige of a bygone era. That era
was one that did not recognize the many talents & capabilities of
those under guardianship, including the ability of many to prop-
erly exercise the fundamental right to vote. Rather than leaving
that vestige intact and with illusory vitality, it is best to declare its
day done. Accordingly, this Court declares Article VII of the
Minnesota Constitution unconstitutional insofar as it categorically
restricts those under guardianship from voting.72
The current landscape of state laws disenfranchising people with cog-
nitive disabilities thus reveals a confusing array of constitutional provisions
(sometimes retaining language that is unacceptably offensive under contem-
porary standards of respect for the dignity of persons with cognitive disabil-
ities), often contradictory statutes governing voting rights and guardianship
procedures, and practices in administering those statutes that are often in-
consistent with both the constitutional and the statutory mandates. Courts
that have been asked to make sense of this confusion have taken widely
differing approaches to applying the Equal Protection and Due Process
clauses of the U.S. Constitution to reach the same substantive result: up-
holding a state’s right to disenfranchise persons who lack the ability to
67. Id. at 22 n.5.
68. Id. at 25.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 22.
71. In re Guardianship of Brian W. Erickson, supra note 39, at 23–24.
72. Id. at 24.
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comprehend the nature and act of voting, but requiring a procedurally-pro-
tected and individualized determination of each person’s ability before im-
posing such a disenfranchisement. In the next section, we will examine
what appear to be the limits to this growing unease with blanket disen-
franchisement of all persons with cognitive disabilities.
D. The Limits of the Current Discourse on Protecting the Right to Vote
of the Cognitively Impaired
This section will examine the nature of the emerging consensus with
respect to blanket disenfranchisement of all persons with cognitive disabili-
ties, as well as the limits to this consensus: (1) continued resistance to
changing offensive constitutional language or revising statutes; and (2) in-
formal practices in which private parties, rather than the state, effectively
disenfranchise persons with cognitive disabilities.
1. The Emerging Consensus: Individualized Determinations of
Capacity to Vote are Required
The struggle of the Maine and Minnesota courts to find workarounds
to outdated constitutional language described in the previous section signals
an essential fundamental unease with the bald-faced disenfranchisement
that people with cognitive impairments found in many state constitutions
and statutes. In 2007, the state of New Jersey passed a referendum eliminat-
ing its constitutional restriction on voting by an “idiot or insane person.”73
Idaho’s constitutional provision barring an “idiot or insane person” from
voting was changed in 1982 to apply only to persons “under guardianship”;
in 1998, this disenfranchisement provision was eliminated entirely.74 Case
law in other states has accomplished similar results,75 and jurisdictions such
as Washington, Wisconsin, Delaware, and Iowa have enacted laws “adopt-
ing more individualized functional assessments rather than categorical defi-
nitions of capacity.”76 Many of these changes have flowed from the
revolution in guardianship laws since the 1990s, based on the recognition
that “mental capacity is not an all or nothing, black or white categoriza-
tion.”77 A growing number of states now require specific determinations of
which rights a ward can retain under guardianship, including the right to
vote.78
73. Kelley, supra note 21, at 377 n.133.
74. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 936 n.28.
75. See, e.g., Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir.
2007) (signaling its approval of an analysis of Missouri law similar to that in Doe v. Rowe, but
denying the standing of the Missouri Protection and Advocacy Services to bring the case).
76. Kelley, supra note 21, at 380 (citing Del. Code Ann. tit. 15 § 1701; Iowa Code
§ 633.556; Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5), Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g).
77. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 932.
78. Id. at 951–56.
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These questions are garnering increased attention with the aging of the
population and growing numbers of people with cognitive impairments due
to dementia. As one scholar has noted, “Voting rates are highest among
persons aged 65 to 74 years, and age is the chief risk factor for dementia.
Estimates suggest that by 2050, there will be about 15 million persons with
dementia in the United States.”79 In 2007, the American Bar Association
used the occasion of a symposium on “Facilitating Voting as People Age:
Implications of Cognitive Impairment” to release a set of recommendations
that seem to capture the emerging consensus:
State constitutions and statutes that permit exclusion of a person
from voting on the basis of mental incapacity, including guardian-
ship and election laws, should explicitly state that the right to vote
is retained, except by court order where the following criteria
must be met:
(1) The exclusion is based on a determination by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction;
(2) Appropriate due process protections have been afforded;
(3) The court finds that the person cannot communicate, with or
without accommodations, a specific desire to participate in the
voting process; and
(4) The findings are established by clear and convincing
evidence.80
These changes in state constitutions, voting laws, and guardianship laws
and procedures appear to reflect the growing awareness of the reality that
cognitive impairment is not a condition exclusive to the previously-segre-
gated populations of state institutions, but is instead a condition that awaits
a growing number of us, with the aging of the population.
2. Continued Obstacles to Implementing that Emerging Consensus
Despite this apparent emergence of scholarly and judicial sensitivity to
the injustice of blanket disenfranchisement due to cognitive disabilities, sig-
nificant obstacles remain to the widespread enfranchisement: continued
public resistance to changing constitutions and laws and informal gate-
keeping practices by private individuals with control over the lives of peo-
ple with cognitive disabilities.
(a) Public Resistance to Changing Constitutions and Laws
There has been little progress in eliminating clearly outdated and of-
fensive language from state constitutions in order to conform to modern
79. Jason H. Karlawish et al., Addressing the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Raised by
Voting by Persons with Dementia, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1345, 1345 (2004).
80. American Bar Association Recommendation and Report, from Symposium: Facilitating
Voting as People Age: Implications of Cognitive Impairment (Aug. 13, 2007), http://
www.abanet.org/aging/docs/Voting_Rec_FINAL_approved.doc.
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sensibilities. In both 1997 and 2000, the citizens of Maine rejected referen-
dums to remove from its Constitution the language disenfranchising persons
under guardianship for mental illness that was found unconstitutional in
Doe v. Rowe.81 The lack of any movement towards repealing such patently
offensive language from state constitutions is notable, given our culture’s
persistent efforts to address similar language affecting other minority
groups such as African-Americans or the LGBTQ community. Scholars
have noted the general lack of public support for repealing disenfranchising
laws.82 This does not appear to be an issue that has galvanized enough po-
litical support to make it worth the attention of any candidates running for
public office—perhaps because, by definition, the affected parties are not
able to reward these candidates with their vote.
(b) Informal Gate-keeping at Other Points in the Voting
Process
Even if legal reform is effective, many of the voting barriers facing
people with cognitive impairments occur through informal, and often pri-
vate, actions that are taken without any regard to legal standards. One study
observes:
There are several points in the path to casting a ballot at which
one of these disqualification provisions might disenfranchise an
individual. First, registration forms may ask for information—
such as whether an individual is under guardianship—that then
leads to the application being rejected. Second, when a person
attempts to register or to vote, a voting official might doubt his
capacity and refuse to supply a registration form or a ballot.
Third, staff at long-term care facilities or family caregivers may
serve as gatekeepers, deciding whether to inform individuals of
their right to vote and whether and how to assist them in register-
ing or voting. Such gatekeepers might systematically assume that
some or all persons with dementia lack the capacity to vote based
on legal status, stereotypical judgments, or family preferences.
Alternatively, these persons might assume that everyone who ex-
presses a desire to vote is competent to do so.83
Informal gate-keeping of the type described above is much more diffi-
cult to address than the more blatant disenfranchisement displayed in state
constitutions and laws and is thus perhaps an even more significant obstacle
than even the most offensive constitutional provision. It is, of course, im-
possible to identify the extent to which such gate-keeping is conducted by
family caregivers who make assumptions about voting desires or capacities.
81. Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 38 n.3.
82. Schriner, supra note 1.
83. Karlawish et al., supra note 79, at 1346; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting
Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 917, 922 (2007).
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It is equally difficult to quantify the amount of such gatekeeping taking
place by voting officials, or by caregivers in institutional settings.
However, a few recent studies offer some insight. In 2003, one survey
was conducted of support personnel for people with cognitive disabilities,
asking a series of questions such as:
how many of the clients expressed an interest in voting; how
often their parents or guardians requested that voting skills should
be taught; how many of their clients were registered to vote; how
many of their clients had voting included in their service plans;
how often respondents provided voting instruction to their clients;
whether clients were ever shown polling places; and whether the
respondent was aware that his/her state had a disenfranchisement
provision?84
The findings suggested that very few clients had expressed an interest in
voting, had voting included in their service plans, or had been provided any
instruction in voting.85 A couple of studies have also been done of long-
term care facilities in Pennsylvania and Virginia that revealed some screen-
ing for capacity to vote resulting in determinations about which residents
should be permitted to vote or should be provided assistance in voting.86
Perhaps the strongest proof that informal screening of this type is be-
ing conducted in long-term care facilities lies in the growing scholarly at-
tention to the appropriate mechanisms for conducting such screening for
aging residents with dementia.87 Indeed, an instrument for such screening
has been developed, known as the “Competence Assessment Tool for Vot-
ing” (CAT-V).88 It sets the stage for a series of questions with the following
script:
I’m going to ask you some questions about elections. This should
take about five minutes. If you don’t understand something I say
or ask, please tell me and I will repeat it. Some of the questions
may seem very simple to you, but don’t worry about that. We are
just looking for straightforward answers. Do you have any ques-
tions before we begin?89
84. Martin Agran & Carolyn Hughes, “You Can’t Vote—You’re Mentally Incompetent”: De-
nying Democracy to People with Severe Disabilities, 38 RES. & PRAC. FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE
DISABILITIES 58, 59 (2013).
85. Id. at 60.
86. Nina A. Kohn, Cognitive Impairment and the Right to Vote: Rethinking the Meaning of
Accessible Elections, 1 CANADIAN J. OF ELDER LAW 29, 39 (2008) (citing Karlawish et al., Identi-
fying the Barriers and Challenges to Voting by Residents in Nursing Homes and Assisted Living
Settings, 20 J. AGING & SOC. POL’Y 65 (2008); Richard Bonnie & Colleagues, How Does Voting
Occur in Long-Term Care, Interview Script and Responses (Spring 2005) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author)).
87. See, e.g., Symposium, Facilitating Voting as People Age: Implications of Cognitive Im-
pairment, supra note 80, at 851.
88. Paul S. Appelbaum, Richard J. Bonnie & Jason H. Karlawish, The Capacity to Vote of
Persons With Alzheimer’s Disease, 162 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 2094, 2099 (2005).
89. Id.
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The following question tests understanding of the nature of voting:
Imagine that two candidates are running for Governor of [sub-
ject’s state], and that today is Election Day in [subject’s state].
What will the people of [subject’s state] do today to pick the next
Governor?” [Note to interviewer: If subject describes how he/she
or people in general would choose between the two choices for
governor (i.e., watch TV ads, listen to their campaign issues, etc.),
ask: “Well that’s how you might decide who you think should be
governor. But how would you actually indicate your choice?90
The following question tests understanding of the effect of voting:
When the election for governor is over, how will it be decided who the
winner is?91 To assess the subject’s ability to choose among the candidates,
the subject receives a card with the following information in large print:
Let me ask you to imagine the following about the two candidates
who are running. Candidate A thinks the state should be doing
more to provide health insurance to people who don’t have it, and
should be spending more money on schools. He is willing to raise
taxes to get the money to do these things. Candidate B says the
government should not provide health insurance but should make
it easier for employers to offer it. He believes that the schools
have enough money already but need tighter controls to make
sure they use it properly. He is against raising taxes.92
The subject is then asked: Based on what I just told you, which candi-
date do you think you are more likely to vote for: A or B?93
Thus, informal gatekeeping mechanisms administered by voting offi-
cials and caretakers, family or otherwise, are clearly being used to deter-
mine whether some voters with cognitive impairments should be allowed to
vote. These mechanisms pose significant obstacles to voting by persons
with cognitive impairments. These obstacles are more difficult to identify
and address than the more obvious obstacles of disenfranchisement laws.
The growing legal and scholarly consensus about the need to conduct an
individualized assessment of a person’s capacity to understand the act of
voting is meaningless if the assessments are conducted by people who are
not aware of the need to conduct such assessments or the appropriate stan-
dards for doing so.
3. Evidence of Lack of Social Consensus on Enfranchising People
with Cognitive Disabilities
The lack of movement on changing disenfranchisement laws to reflect
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voting capabilities of a person with cognitive impairments evidences a lack
of a widespread social consensus about the enfranchisement of people with
cognitive disabilities. Indeed, the widespread practice of, and growing at-
tention to establish standards for, informal gate-keeping mechanisms re-
flects a general support for such disenfranchisement. Let us now turn to a
closer look at the arguments that support the continued disenfranchisement
of persons with cognitive impairments.
II. PROBING BELOW THE SURFACE: IS MENTAL INCAPACITY A VALID
REASON FOR DISENFRANCHISEMENT?
The current state of the disenfranchisement of voters with cognitive
impairments thus reveals a general acceptance of the presumption expressed
in the Voting Rights Act—that mental incapacity is a legitimate reason to
denying a person the right to vote at all. This presumption underlies the
emerging consensus on the path to reforming unconstitutionally arbitrary
state constitutional and statutory disenfranchisement schemes by limiting
the voting restriction to cases where some determination has been made that
a person’s developmental disability disqualifies her from exercising the
right to vote. It underlies our acceptance of the growing practice of informal
administration of cognitive screens for voting in institutions such as long-
term care facilities.
But is this fundamental presumption justified? Why should mental in-
capacity—even if established by a probate judge in a guardianship hear-
ing—cause a person to lose the right to vote? Why is voting so
categorically different from other fundamental rights that have been found
to inhere to people with cognitive disabilities, such as the right to a free and
appropriate public education, the right to live in the community, or the right
to get a job?94 Why do we have no statutory scheme to provide more sup-
port for the person with a cognitive disability to understand the act of vot-
ing, rather than barring them from voting? Let us now consider the
rationales for disenfranchising people with cognitive impairments—historic
and contemporary—and assess their strength as responses to the foregoing
questions.
A. Rationales for Disenfranchising Persons with Cognitive Impairments
Most of the laws disenfranchising people with cognitive impairments
were enacted in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, based on rationales
that we would largely find unacceptable today. These laws are largely re-
tained, though based on more contemporary rationales. In this section of the
Article, I will briefly examine the now-discredited rationales for enactment
of the original disenfranchisement laws. Then, I will analyze the contempo-
94. Bagenstos, supra note 3, at n.8–31 and accompanying text.
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rary rationales for retaining these disenfranchisement laws: (1) preserving
the political community, (2) ensuring an intelligent electorate, and (3)
preventing voter fraud. I will offer a critical analysis of all three of these
rationales, concluding that their assertion may mask the persistence of his-
toric rationales for disenfranchising persons with cognitive impairments.
1. Historical Rationales for Disenfranchising Persons with
Cognitive Impairments
Legal scholar Jennifer Bindel has identified three broad categories of
rationales for the enactment of the original disenfranchisements statutes.
The first is the assumption that a person with diminished mental capacity
had no intellect and was thus disqualified from participation in civic soci-
ety.95 Rationality was held to be a prerequisite to giving consent to the
formation of the social contract underlying the selection of elected repre-
sentatives in a democratic government. The interests of this population
would be adequately protected by the paternalistic benevolence of rational
voters.96
The second rationale was based on Social Darwinist theory. Bindel
explains:
Prohibiting persons with diminished capacities from voting was
one way to shield society from the negative consequences Social
Darwinists theorized would follow from allowing this population
to participate fully in society. By keeping persons with dimin-
ished mental capacities from voting, legislators both protected so-
ciety from the results of their decisions and symbolically
excluded them from the civic body of America.97
The third rationale identified by Bindel is more practical—namely, the
protection of the electoral advantage of the inhabitants of the localities
where large insane asylums and institutions were being built as segregated
housing for persons with mental illness and developmental disabilities.98
Bindel notes that large concentrations of residents of such institutions might
have been able to control the outcome of local elections, motivating the
enactment of disenfranchisement laws for persons with diminished
capacities.99
95. Jennifer A. Bindel, Note, Equal Protection Jurisprudence and the Voting Rights of Per-
sons with Diminished Mental Capacities, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 87, 103 (2009).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 105.
98. Id. at 106.
99. Bindel notes a more recent indication of the same impulse when twenty-five mentally
challenged persons’ voter registration forms were rejected by Ohio election workers when the
upcoming local election involved a bond issue for a new mental retardation facility and workshop
that had failed by only four or five votes in the previous election. Id. (citing Barbara Armstrong,
The Mentally Disabled and the Right to Vote, 27 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 577, 580
(1976)).
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Legal scholar Nicholas Brescia identifies three derivative versions of
the historical arguments described above that are often used to support the
continued disenfranchisement of persons with cognitive impairments:
(1) their disability prevents them from being full participatory
members of society;
(2) they lack the mental capacity to participate in politics; and
(3) their interests are vicariously represented by other individuals
and groups acting in their best interests.100
He argues persuasively, however, that “each of these arguments resem-
bles similar judgments women’s suffrage activists had to overcome.”101 In-
deed, none of these rationales can survive the widespread ascendance of
tenBroek’s principal of integrationism described by Professor Bagenstos.102
So what does sustain the disenfranchisement laws that survive?
2. Contemporary Rationales for Disenfranchising Persons with
Cognitive Impairments
Three contemporary rationales for disenfranching persons with cogni-
tive disabilities that have been asserted are (1) preserving the political com-
munity, (2) ensuring an intelligent electorate, and (3) preventing voter
fraud. This section will first examine the Supreme Court’s assessment of
the validity of those arguments generally and will then consider more criti-
cal scholarly assessment of the validity of those arguments in the context of
the disenfranchisement of people with cognitive disabilities.
(a) The Supreme Court’s Assessment of Articulated Rationales
for Disenfranchising Persons with Cognitive
Impairments in Other Contexts
Three rationales asserted for disenfranchisement of persons with cog-
nitive impairments have been considered by the Supreme Court in other
contexts. The rationales were accepted, to varying degrees, as compelling
enough state interests to withstand heightened scrutiny.103 The first ratio-
nale is the need to preserve the political community, by distinguishing vot-
ers who intend to express some preference and affect the results of an
100. Nicholas F. Brescia, Comment, Modernizing State Voting Laws that Disenfranchise the
Mentally Disabled with the Aid of Past Suffrage Movements, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 943, 956–57
(2010).
101. Id. at 957.
102. Professor tenBroek distinguished between the historical attitude toward people with disa-
bilities, custodialism (“in which the goal was to protect and maintain people with disabilities as
essentially wards of the state”) and the more modern principle of “integrationism” (“in which the
goal was to provide people with disabilities the support to enable them to participate fully in the
life of the community”). Bagenstos, supra note 3, at 2; see also id. at notes 8–31 and accompany-
ing text.
103. See generally Karlan, supra note 83, at 923–25; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 319.
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election from those who do not understand the nature of the act of voting.104
The second is preventing voter fraud by ensuring that others do not use a
cognitively impaired person’s vote for their own preferences.105 The third is
ensuring an intelligent electorate.106
Legal scholar Pamela Karlan understands the first two reasons as re-
lated aspects of a state’s power “to preserve the basic conception of a politi-
cal community”—one conceptual, and one practical.107 She writes, “As a
matter of democratic theory, courts might discern a difference between vot-
ers who intend to express some preference—however that preference is de-
rived—and voters who have no conscious intention of expressing a
preference designed to affect electoral outcomes.”108 Preventing voter
fraud, on the other hand, is recognition of the practical reality that “includ-
ing within the electorate individuals who do not understand the nature of
voting creates a pool of potential votes that might be cast by anyone with
the ability to gain access to those individuals’ ballots.”109 Both of these
interests have been upheld by the Supreme Court as compelling government
interests, justifying disenfranchisement in some circumstances.110
The third interest—that of ensuring an intelligent electorate—has been
met with more skepticism. Karlan notes:
[A]lthough the Supreme Court once suggested that fairly adminis-
tered literacy tests might be constitutional because they “promote
intelligent use of the ballot, that decision antedated the applica-
tion of heightened scrutiny to restrictions on the franchise. The
Court has both subsequently upheld federal statutes barring such
prerequisites and, applying heightened scrutiny, rejected a juris-
diction’s claim that it could limit participation in school board
elections to a subgroup of the citizenry that was more likely to
‘understand the whys and wherefores of the detailed operations of
the school system” in light of’ the ever increasing complexity of
the many interacting phases of the school system and structure.”
Thus, the mere fact that some citizens labor under cognitive im-
pairments that preclude them from casting their ballots in opti-
mally intelligent ways cannot by itself justify disenfranchisement.
Regardless of our republican aspirations about citizens engaging
in public decision-making, we have recognized since the time of
the Federalist Papers that voters will often behave selfishly, preju-
dicially, and irrationally. The fact that voters who are cognitively
impaired may not process information in a sophisticated or en-
104. Karlan, supra note 83, at 924.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 925.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972); Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006).
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tirely rational manner may separate them only in degree-if even
that-from the remainder of the electorate.111
(b) Assessing the Validity of the Articulated Rationales
Since disenfranchisement is such a serious deprivation of a citizen’s
rights, scholars have been critically examining the rationales described
above in the context of disenfranchisement of persons with cognitive disa-
bilities. This subsection will examine the critiques of each of these ratio-
nales in turn.
(i) Preserving political community
Some of the anxiety about preserving the political community is argua-
bly a version of the historical concerns about preserving the electoral ad-
vantage of a community against voting by large blocks of voters with
interests that diverge from those of the general population. As a practical
matter, Professor of Psychiatry Paul Appelbaum notes that this should not
be a significant concern in light of the closing of large institutions and inte-
gration of people with disabilities throughout the community.112 Further,
some studies have suggested that extending the right to vote to people with
cognitive disabilities is unlikely to have a significant impact on the outcome
of most elections.113 Appelbaum describes the results of these studies as
follows:
When patients at a New York state hospital in the early days of
deinstitutionalization were asked to cast mock ballots for a may-
oral contest on election day, the results closely resembled the out-
come in the district surrounding the hospital. A larger-scale study
from three Maryland state hospitals in a presidential election year
similarly showed that patients’ choices mapped those made in the
state’s urban areas, from which most of the patient population
was drawn. Thus it seems unlikely that extending the franchise
more broadly to persons with mental disabilities would alter the
outcome of many elections.114
In an article jointly written with legal scholar Sally Hurme, Appel-
baum adds that, conceptually, it is difficult to identify the harm from in-
competent voting:
Should an incompetent individual be allowed to cast a ballot by
virtue of an unduly lax standard, the harm to that person is mini-
111. Karlan, supra note 83, at 924–25 (citations omitted); see Dunn, 405 U.S. at 356.
112. Paul S. Appelbaum, “I Vote. I Count”: Mental Disability and the Right to Vote, 51
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 849, 850 (2000).
113. Id.
114. Id. (citing Morris M. Klein & Saul A. Grossman, Voting Pattern of Mental Patients in a
Community State Hospital, 3 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 149 (1967); Alfred M. Wellner &
Lawrence S. Gaines, Patients’ Right to Vote, 21 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS., 163 (1970)).
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mal and indirect. If the person’s choice is different than what he
or she would competently have chosen there might be said to be
an intangible injury to his or her broader interests in exercising an
authentic, autonomous choice. But it is more difficult to identify
potential concrete harms to the polity. A single incompetently
cast ballot is not likely to affect the course of an election, and
even a larger number of such ballots, assuming that the errors
they reflect are distributed randomly, are unlikely to have a sub-
stantial impact. Hence, even if the well-being of a person casting
an incompetent vote would be better served by the candidate for
whom he or she would have voted if competent, but by virtue of
incompetence did not, the likelihood that the incompetently cast
ballot will affect the outcome of the election, and thus harm the
person in a material way, is slight.115
Appelbaum and Hurme do note, however, that:
Were the voting public to perceive that incompetent persons rou-
tinely cast ballots, the seriousness with which competent voters
approach the process of selecting candidates and issues for their
support might be diminished. Why is it worth spending time ana-
lyzing the choices on the ballot, a competent voter might ask,
when the state is willing to allow even clearly incompetent people
to participate in what one might conclude is not a terribly impor-
tant process?116
The legitimacy of this concern, however, assumes that the voting pub-
lic does have confidence that competent voters are casting their ballots seri-
ously, which is related to the rationale of ensuring an intelligent electorate.
(ii) Ensuring an Intelligent Electorate
As noted above, the Supreme Court has demonstrated increasing hos-
tility to constitutional validity of rationale of ensuring an intelligent electo-
rate as a legitimate state interest that could justify disenfranchisement of
people with cognitive impairments.117 But it is also practically suspect as a
rationale for disenfranchising persons with diminished mental capacity.
Karlan describes a study by neurologist Oliver Sacks, who observed a ward
of neurology patients watching a televised address by President Ronald
Reagan.118 Saks found that his aphasiac patients, who could not understand
the meaning of the words, responded negatively to the false tones and ca-
dences of President Reagan’s voice; at the same time, a patient with agno-
sia, who could not process tone or feeling, but only words, responded
negatively to the deceptive message in the words.119 Only people without
115. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 963–64 (2007).
116. Id.
117. See Dunn, 405 U.S. 330; see also Purcell, 549 U.S. 1.
118. Karlan, supra note 83, at 917.
119. Id.
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aphasia or agnosia were fooled by the combination of deceptive word-use
combined with deceptive tone.120 Karlan concludes that “much of our polit-
ical discourse, for better or worse, bypasses the conscious mind altogether,
and that a large number of citizens’ views and choices are driven by a range
of irrelevant factors and fortuities—such as a candidate’s height, whether
he uses a nickname, or the format of the ballot.”121
The Supreme Court’s growing discomfort with literacy tests122 rests on
our long history of the abuse of such tests. One group of scholars notes:
The US experience with “literacy” tests inquiring about detailed
issues of constitutional law and political science amply demon-
strates that any standard that probes more deeply into a person’s
electoral understanding carries with it an inherent risk of subjec-
tive and arbitrary application. Moreover, even if such a standard
could be consistently and fairly applied, contemporary legal doc-
trine rejects restrictions based on factors such as education or par-
ticular knowledge as incompatible with our commitment to a
universal franchise. Many individuals who are entirely competent
may base their votes on what others may regard as “irrational”
considerations, but their choices are respected nonetheless.”123
(iii) Preventing Voting Fraud
Of the three rationales for disenfranchising persons with cognitive dis-
abilities, the state’s interest in preventing voting fraud would thus seem to
be the sole remaining legitimate rationale. Given the significance of the
deprivation of liberty entailed in disenfranchisement, however, this would
not seem to support disenfranchisement standing on its own. The area of
consumer law presents a wide panoply of actions that can be taken by gov-
ernments which protect vulnerable populations against fraud, rather than
denying them access to the instruments of commerce that make such fraud
possible, such as television, telephones, and the internet. Why is the default
position—with respect to voting—to disenfranchise the person with cogni-
tive disabilities rather than devise means of protecting them against fraud?
Is it possible that the rationale of the prevention of voting fraud is not a
legitimate, free-standing rationale, but rather an excuse that masks the per-
sistence of the now unfashionable, historic rationales for disenfranchising
persons with cognitive disabilities such as those noted by Brescia?124 The
history of the eventual victory of tenBroek’s integrationist theories, leading
to the eventual inclusion of persons with disabilities into most aspects of
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See Dunn, 405 U.S. 330; see also Purcell, 549 U.S. 1.
123. Karlawish et al., supra note 79, at 1346.
124. Brescia, supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also Agran & Hughes, supra note
84, at 60–61.
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society, as described in the following paragraphs, reveals a persistent identi-
fication of persons with disabilities with the other group of disenfranchised
Americans—convicted felons.
In the seminal case leading to the closure of the Willowbrook State
Developmental Center in New York,125 federal District Court Judge Judd
found that the conditions in Willowbrook violated the constitutional right of
persons living in state custodial institutions to be protected from harm.126
According to Judge Judd, the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to protection
from harm in a state institution meant that the residents of Willowbrook
were “entitled to at least the same living conditions as prisoners,”127 mean-
ing not only that the state had an affirmative obligation not to abuse the
residents, but also to provide medical, therapeutic, and recreational care.
In the Alabama case of Wyatt v. Stickney,128 U.S. District Court Judge
Johnson articulated a “right to habilitation,” for the patients involuntarily
committed to two state mental hospitals, as well as those in the Partlow
School because of developmental disabilities.129 He noted that these people
had been “involuntarily committed through noncriminal procedures and
without the constitutional protections that are afforded defendants in crimi-
nal proceedings.”130 He continued, “Adequate and effective treatment is
constitutionally required because, absent treatment, the hospital is trans-
formed ‘into a penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no con-
victed offense.’”131 Judge Johnson’s remedies came to be known as the
“Wyatt Standards,” a set of minimum constitutional standards for the ade-
quate treatment of people with mental illness and developmental disabili-
ties.132 The focus in the Wyatt Standards on the obligation of the state to
assist each resident to “acquire and maintain those life skills which enable
him to cope more effectively with the demands of his own person and of his
environment”133 constituted an important step to the eventual adoption of
the tenBroek’s integration mandate.134
In Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital,135 involving the
Pennhurst school in Pennsylvania, U.S. District Court Judge Broderick
125. N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764
(1973).
126. Id. at 764–65.
127. Id. at 764.
128. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
129. Id. at 784–85; Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972). .
130. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 784.
131. Id. (citing Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
132. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 395–407. See generally Norman S. Rosenberg & Paul R. Fried-
man, Developmental Disability Law: A Look into the Future, 31 STAN. L. REV. 817 (1979)
(describing the history and application of the Wyatt Standards).
133. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 395.
134. See generally Rosenberg & Friedman, supra note 132 (describing impact of the Wyatt
Standards).
135. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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found that three, distinct constitutional rights of the residents had been vio-
lated, including the constitutional right to be free from physical harm.136
Judge Broderick wrote: “The retarded at Pennhurst have been physically
abused. Lack of adequate supervision has produced an atmosphere of dan-
ger to the residents. Occasionally, there have been incidents of staff abuse
of residents, including rape and beatings. Hundreds of injuries, both major
and minor, are reported every month.”137 Judge Broderick held that re-
sidents of state institutions for the retarded have both an Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendment right to freedom from harm.138 Quoting Judge Judd in
the New York case, Judge Broderick wrote:
Since [the residents] are for the most part confined behind locked
gates, and are held without the possibility of a meaningful waiver
of their right to freedom, they must be entitled to at least the same
living conditions as prisoners. . . . One of the basic rights of a
person in confinement is protection from assaults by fellow in-
mates or by staff. . . . Another is the correction of conditions
which violate basic standards of human decency.139
The thread of analogies between persons with disabilities and con-
victed felons that runs through these cases evidences a persistent identifica-
tion of persons with disabilities and imprisoned felons, which persists most
glaringly in the Voting Rights Act’s continued identification of the two
populations. However, as we have seen in our discussion of the rationales
for disenfranchising persons with cognitive impairments in Section II.A.2
of this Article, there are serious reasons to doubt the legitimacy of two of
those rationales: preserving the political community and ensuring an intelli-
gent electorate. The third rationale, preventing voter fraud, could be ad-
dressed through an approach analogous to that adopted in preventing
consumer fraud—that is, empowering the vulnerable population to protect
itself, rather than denying the vulnerable population access to consumer
goods and services, or to the vote. Indeed, that approach would be more
consistent with the triumph of tenBroek’s integrationist principle detailed
by Professor Bagenstos in his article to this symposium issue.140 Surely the
right to vote is more important than the right to purchase consumer goods or
obtain credit cards. I would argue that it is time to acknowledge the grow-
ing judicial consensus described in Section I.D.1. of this Article—that bar-
riers to voting by persons with cognitive impairments raise serious
constitutional and policy concerns—and to attempt to address the continued
obstacles to implementing the emerging consensus identified in Section
136. Id. at 1321.
137. Id. at 1320.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1321.
140. Bagenstos, supra note 3.
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I.D.2 of this Article. The following section explores ways in which this
might be done.
B. Exploring Ways to Remove Obstacles to Voting by Those with
Cognitive Impairments
In order to disrupt the seemingly entrenched assumption it is legitimate
to deny persons with cognitive disabilities the right to vote, it is necessary
to remember that this assumption is nothing more than one possible policy
choice. The chaotic and contradictory constitutional, statutory, and practical
implementation schemes displayed by the various states described in Sec-
tions I.B and C of this Article vividly illustrates the wide range of possibili-
ties with respect to voting that different sets of policy makers in different
states have adopted. Hurme and Appelbaum explain this vividly:
[T]he definition of the criteria for the capacity [to vote] is an ex-
ercise in policy, not science. . . . There is no scientifically deter-
minable point on that spectrum at which we can say that the
person manifests sufficient capacity for the task. How much ca-
pacity we require for any given task reflects the weight we give to
the importance of allowing persons to perform the task even in
the face of some degree of impairment, tallied against the weight
of concerns regarding the possible adverse outcomes of the task if
performed by someone whose capacity may be impaired. Essen-
tially, this is a determination of how to allocate the risk of error.
So the drafters of state constitutions, the authors of legisla-
tion, and the crafters of judicial opinions are making what is ines-
capably a policy decision about a decisional capacity when they
attempt to define an appropriate standard for the capacity to
vote. . . . Thus, policymakers have a good deal of latitude in craft-
ing decisional capacity standards based on the previously noted
considerations of whether to encourage free exercise of the deci-
sional right in question or to protect the allegedly impaired person
or others from the consequences of a less-than-optimal decisional
process.141
Different countries have enacted voting laws based on different as-
sumptions about voting rights for persons with cognitive disabilities, and
scholars have proposed many imaginative ways to address obstacles to vot-
ing. The next two sections will explore these alternatives.
1. Options Adopted by Other Countries
In her classic book Frontiers of Justice, Martha Nussbaum singles out
the deprivation of the right to vote (along with the deprivation of religious
liberty) as particularly offensive to the recognition of equal dignity of all.
She points out that many nations, including Sweden and Israel, have guardi-
141. Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 18, at 962–63.
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anship structures that are much more protective of the right to self-determi-
nation for people with developmental disabilities than those of the United
States, preserving the right to vote for those with developmental
disabilities.142
Other countries that impose no mental capacity requirements on the
right to vote include Ireland, Italy, and Canada.143 Legal scholar Nina Kohn
tells the following story of Canada’s relatively recent enfranchisement of
the cognitively impaired.144 The Canadian Elections Act excluded any per-
son “restrained of his liberty of movement or deprived of the management
of his property by reason of mental disease” from voting.145 In 1998,
Madam Justice Reed of the Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division held
that this provision conflicted with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, which guarantees the right to vote to “every citizen of Canada.”146
She argued that the exclusion in the Elections Act was overbroad (exclud-
ing people whose disability might not affect their voting judgment) and
arbitrary (excluding only a subset of persons whose voting judgment might
be affected by mental disease).147 The Royal Commission on Electoral Re-
form and Party Financing studied this case, and in its final report agreed
that the exclusion in the law was too broad. But the Commission also in-
sisted that some citizens were “clearly incapable” of voting because of their
mental incapacity, and that the “integrity of the vote and the dignity of
citizens who cannot function as voters for reasons of mental incapacity de-
mand that there be some restrictions on the franchise.”148 The Commission
recommended maintaining voting restrictions for (1) “a person subject to a
regime established to protect the person or the person’s property, pursuant
to the law of a province or territory, because the person is totally incapable
of understanding the nature and consequences of his or her acts” and (2) “a
person confined to a psychiatric or other institute as a result of being acquit-
ted of an offence under the Criminal Code by reason of insanity.”149 How-
ever, Parliament chose to repeal the Election Act provision entirely. As a
result, mental incapacity is no longer a basis for voter disqualification in
Canada in federal elections.150
142. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE 195–99 (2006).
143. Kohn, supra note 86, at 36.
144. Id. at 45–46.
145. Canada Elections Act. R.S.C., c. 14 (1985).
146. Canadian Disability Rights Council v. Canada, [1988] 3 F.C. 622, 624.
147. Id.
148. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform & Party Financing, Final Report 39 (1992).
149. Id. at  39–41.
150. An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act, s. 23(3) (assented May 6, 1993) in Acts of
the Parliament of Canada, 41-42 Eliz. II, Vol. 1 (1993). However, one province, Nunavut, cur-
rently allows for voter disqualification on the basis of mental incapacity. Nunavut Elections Act, S.
Nu. 20002, c. 17, § 7.
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2. Possible Reforms of Voting Rights of Persons with Cognitive
Disabilities
The possible options for reform of voting rights of persons with cogni-
tive disability considered by scholars in recent years ranges from abolishing
any restrictions, to reforming state constitutions and laws to conform to the
emerging consensus against blanket restrictions, to protections against in-
formal gate-keeping mechanisms, to reforming voting policies and proce-
dures to offer support for voting by persons with cognitive impairment, to
emphasizing education about voting in special education curriculums, indi-
vidualized education plans, and service plans.
(a) Abolishing Restrictions on Voting by People with
Cognitive Impairments
A number of scholars have begun to question legitimacy of any restric-
tion on voting based on mental incapacity. Kohn argues:
While the argument that healthy democracies require intelligent
and informed electorates appears, at first glance, to be a compel-
ling reason for imposing mental capacity requirements, further
examination is warranted. Although it is certainly desirable for
voters to be able to intelligently and rationally evaluate candidates
and issues, it does not necessarily follow that there should be a
threshold level of capacity legally required of voters. Such capac-
ity requirements pose a myriad of problems, including those asso-
ciated with selective enforcement and those associated with the
potential disenfranchisement of individuals who do understand
the nature and consequences of their votes. Thus, at least in some
democracies, the costs imposed by such requirements may out-
weigh their benefits. In reexamining such requirements, countries
would fare well to examine the Canadian experience with the re-
peal of such requirements in order to determine what effect, if
any, the repeal has had on the Canadian system of government.151
Legal scholar Stephen Schwarz explores the implications of abolishing
the doctrine of competency in a number of areas of disability law, including
voting. He argues:
The doctrine of legal competency is perhaps the most pervasive
and invasive distinction between persons with disabilities and
those who temporarily lack such conditions. It classifies all citi-
zens into two distinctly separate and differently entitled groups:
those who are deemed capable of acting knowingly, and those
who are deemed unable to do so. The doctrine establishes a hier-
archy of personhood, with the attributes of full citizenship vested
only in those who satisfy a standard of mental fitness. For those
declared less capable, elementary choices concerning liberty,
151. Kohn, supra note 86, at 45–46 (citations omitted).
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property, and bodily privacy can be, and frequently are, wholly
restricted. Political rights and civic responsibilities can be effec-
tively nullified. In the guise of benevolent protectionism, people
with disabilities may be rendered nonpersons and relegated to a
status of dependency, with full assurance that their views and ac-
tions will not implicate them in difficulty nor subject them to any
consequences—even those which they reasonably seek and un-
derstandably prefer.152
With respect to voting rights, Schwarz argues:
Arguably, in promoting a regime of equality under the law, no
compelling state interest exists in denying the vote to persons
with disabilities who are possibly or even clearly incapable of
comprehending all aspects of the electoral process. Using a stan-
dard of the average voter as the reference for assessing the accept-
ability of an exclusionary rule, one would have to determine what
level of information and understanding is the bare minimum to
qualify for becoming a qualified voter.
There is, of course, an important value in safeguarding the
democratic process against corruption or undue influence. But the
means selected for achieving this legitimate goal should be
equally applicable to all citizens and not have a discriminatory
impact on a selected subgroup. This concern, even if specially
relevant to persons with mental disabilities, can be addressed
through less restrictive means which do not wholly preclude per-
sons with more severe impairments from all participation in the
political process.
The high value traditionally placed on civic responsibility
and membership in the body politic is directly undermined by de-
nying any class of citizens the franchise. The minimal cost to the
democratic process of an occasional uninformed or even unintel-
ligible vote by a person with a serious mental disability is out-
weighed by the stated societal interest in including all persons
with disabilities in the political process. Thus, abolishing the doc-
trine of competency as a standard for restricting the affirmative
exercise of the fundamental right to vote would result in little
burden to the efficient operation of the government and would
significantly facilitate the equal citizenship of persons with disa-
bilities. Where an individual can participate in the electoral pro-
cess by selecting a candidate or position, the issue of competency
should be irrelevant to the person’s right to vote.153
152. Steven J. Schwartz, Abolishing Competency as a Construction of Difference: A Radical
Proposal to Promote the Equality of Persons with Disabilities, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 867, 868–69
(1993).
153. Id. at 871–72 (citations omitted).
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Professors of Education Martin Agran and Carolyn Humes argue that
any minimal comprehension tests of any voters should apply to all voters,
not just those with cognitive disabilities. They contend that:
Existing assumptions and beliefs about denying voting to individ-
uals with an intellectual disability has only prevented these indi-
viduals from receiving systematic instruction on how to vote and
achieving a rightful identity as a citizen. . . .[T]his is a denial of
an individual’s identity as an adult and an unwittingly forced per-
petuation of childhood. This is at base discriminatory and in vio-
lation of federal law and is contrary to current disability policy,
civil rights legislation, and a commitment to ensuring the self-
determination of individuals with intellectual disability. The basis
for this denial is neither grounded in research nor thorough criti-
cal analysis. No U.S. state subjects voters without disabilities to
any type of standard to measure voting capacity. . .voters with an
intellectual disability cannot legally be held to a higher standard
than that held for others.154
All of these scholars make the same argument: uncritical acceptance of
the legitimacy of denying the vote to those with cognitive impairments ig-
nores the fact that voters who are not identified and labelled as cognitively
disabled are not subject to any standards of competency to perform the act
of voting. Targeting persons with intellectual disabilities for such screening
is arguably an appropriate object of enhanced scrutiny, along with the other
issues identified by Professor Bagenstos as appropriately addressed by em-
ploying tenBroek’s abolitionist understanding of equal protection.155
(b) Implementing Reforms to Support Voting by Persons with
Cognitive Disabilities
If it is not realistic to entirely eliminate voting restrictions based on
cognitive disabilities, some measures can certainly be taken to eliminate
some of the existing barriers to voting. As Appelbaum notes, people with
cognitive disabilities have strong interests in preserving the right to vote:
Deprivation of the right to vote sends a message to mentally ill
and retarded citizens that they are not like other people and are
not wanted as part of the broader polity. Conversely, encouraging
patients to vote can be a “therapeutic and normalizing experi-
ence.” More concrete benefits may ensue as well. The sustained
neglect of the needs of persons with mental disabilities—reflected
in a paucity of institutional and community-based services and in
discriminatory health insurance benefits—is the result, in part, of
their lack of political clout. With patients and their families regis-
154. Agran & Hughes, supra note 84, at 60–61.
155. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.
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tered and voting, their needs are likely to be taken more seriously
in the political process.156
First, state constitutions and voting statutes that do not conform to the
emerging consensus concerning the need to make individualized assess-
ments of the ability to understand the act and nature of voting should be
repealed.
Second, efforts should be made to ensure that the informal gate-keep-
ing mechanisms are eliminated or regulated so that they do not violate the
requirements of due process and equal protection. Kohn notes that:
While the notion of empowering long-term care staff or others to
assess properly the mental capacity of suspect individuals before
permitting them to vote has received some support, such ap-
proaches are likely to deny would-be voters both due process and
equal protection of the law. Moreover, singling out certain citi-
zens for such assessments is likely to unfairly target already
marginalized and stigmatized populations, thus further marginal-
izing them and limiting their ability to exert political power.
Moreover, informal assessments – even when done using a stan-
dardized assessment tool – invite fraud by providing justification
for both good faith and bad faith disenfranchisements of persons
whom the evaluator believes will vote in a manner of which or for
a candidate of whom the evaluator disapproves.157
Third, voting policies and procedures should be reformed to support
voting by those with cognitive impairments. There will inevitably be some
costs associated with these measures, as described by Kohn:
Mobile voting, for example, has the potential to heighten the pos-
sibility of undue influence or ballot tampering, may reduce the
sense of community as voting becomes a personal rather than a
public act, and may reduce the public visibility of persons with
disabilities if such persons disproportionately elect to vote at
home. Some techniques that may reduce the cognitive burden as-
sociated with voting may encourage disfavored voting behaviors.
For example, placing candidates’ photos alongside their names on
the ballot page may assist voters with memory deficits, but may
also encourage racially-based voting. Accordingly, jurisdictions
at times will need to balance the interest in increasing the cogni-
tive accessibility of elections against other important governmen-
tal interests.158
But, Kohn notes, these costs may be balanced by benefits to the electo-
rate as a whole:
156. Appelbaum, supra note 112, at 850.
157. Kohn, supra note 86, at 48–49; see also Karlawish et al., supra note 79, at 1346–47.
158. Kohn, supra note 86, at 50 (citations omitted).
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In balancing the value of election reform against its costs, it is
important to recognize that improving the cognitive accessibility
of elections has the potential to help a broad range of voters, not
merely those who have diagnosed cognitive impairments. Confus-
ing ballot designs, for example, can lead to unintentional un-
dervotes and overvotes among both the cognitively impaired and
the cognitively intact. Both the cognitively intact and the cogni-
tively impaired may be disenfranchised as a result of failing to
comply with complex absentee balloting procedures. Distracting
polling conditions may confuse the non-disabled as well as the
disabled. While those with cognitive impairments are likely to
benefit disproportionately from changes to election systems
which reduce confusion and complexity, the general electorate
stands to benefit as well.
Moreover, creating less cognitively demanding voting sys-
tems may have the advantage of decreasing opportunities for
fraud and undue coercion of voters. Where voting systems are
confusing, voters are more likely to require third-party assistance
in order to record their votes. This, in turn, opens the door for
third parties to exert undue coercion or otherwise manipulate the
voting process. While those with cognitive impairments may be
particularly susceptible to such manipulation, the cognitively
unimpaired may also be impacted. In short, improving the cogni-
tive accessibility of election systems is likely to enhance the legit-
imacy of elections by making it more likely that both the
cognitively impaired and the cognitively non-impaired will be
able to vote successfully for the candidates and positions that they
prefer.159
Fourth, schools, parents, and guardians should incorporate education
about voting in special education curriculums of the schools, in the individ-
ualized service plans that guide special education services, and in the ser-
vice plans that guide the provision of state services after graduation from
school.160
III. CONCLUSION
The Federal Voting Rights Act permits states to deny the right to vote
to convicted criminals and persons with cognitive disabilities, offering a
persistent manifestation of the troubling historical identification of these
two groups of citizens. The history of the liberation of persons with cogni-
tive disabilities from prison-like institutions reveals that their constitutional
arguments were often based on prior victories by prisoners to humane treat-
159. Id. at 50–51 (citations omitted).
160. See Agran & Hughes, supra note 84, at 60 (offering evidence that voter education is not a
subject of service plans or concerted education by support personnel serving persons with cogni-
tive disabilities).
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ment while institutionalized. Ultimately, due largely to the triumph of Pro-
fessor tenBroek’s bold vision of full integration of people with disabilities
of all types into our communities, persons with cognitive disabilities, for the
most part, have been released from prison-like institutions. But, as President
Lyndon Johnson recognized, the most powerful instrument for “destroying
the terrible walls which imprison men because they are different” is the
right to vote.161 That right continues to be denied to persons with cognitive
disabilities by states who choose to continue to exercise their prerogatives
under the Voting Rights Act.
Existing state constitutional provisions and disenfranchisement laws
present a chaotic mess of undefined terms, inconsistent laws, and arbitrary
practices imposed on persons with cognitive disabilities. Recent challenges
to these laws and practices reveal a growing consensus that many of these
disenfranchisement laws pose significant concerns under both the U.S. Con-
stitution, and emerging notions of empowerment of persons with cognitive
disabilities to the greatest extent possible, even in guardianship proceed-
ings. Still, this growing consensus toward enfranchisement encounters lim-
its based on a lack of appetite for constitutional or legal reform, and
informal practices that lead to disenfranchisement. A critical examination of
the contemporary rationales for disenfranchisement suggests that the ratio-
nales are not strong, perhaps offering cover for lingering prejudices against
persons with cognitive disabilities that justify their continued exclusion
from our most fundamental democratic processes.
Perhaps adding the right to vote to the list of issues in disability law
and policy that might be addressed with tenBroek’s abolitionist understand-
ing of equal protection will lead to a re-assessment of the Voting Rights
Act’s delegating to the states the right to disenfranchise persons with
“mental incapacity” or of individual states’ exercise of that right.
161. Johnson, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
